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Economics for marketing revisited 
ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to provide evidence supporting the following: that recent theoretical, empirical and methodological 
advances  in  microeconomics  are  decisive  to  the  progress  of  marketing  science.  That  such  a  notion  is  not  yet 
mainstream and uncontroversial, we contend, is more due to insufficient knowledge dissemination and outdated 
perceptions about irreconcilable differences between economists and psychologists than to lack of intrinsic value or 
cognitive appeal. Evidence is provided by describing these advances in a concise manner, showing how they can 
contribute  to  tackle  complex  marketing  issues  and  providing  examples  from  published  matter  in  which  this 
contribution already takes place. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Half a decade after the turn of the millennium it has become clear for marketing 
scholars that a new, underlying logic must evolve so that adequate guidance for the 
conceptual  thought,  research  activities  and  everyday  practice  that  constitute  this 
discipline can continue to be provided. Vargo and Lusch (2004) contend that such an 
evolution requires a paradigmatic shift away from the economic exchange models of 
goods between agents that, according to them, make up the core heritage of marketing 
science, to a way of thinking centered upon intangible resources, collective creation of 
value and inter-agent relationships. However, and although few can reasonably argue 
against  the  wisdom  and  urgency  of  this  evolution  vis-à-vis  the  reality  of  today’s 
marketing discipline, this proposition falls short of providing a consensual and effective 
solution  to  the  deadlock  it  intends  to  resolve.  First  and  foremost,  it  downplays  the 
crucial and interactive role that both behavioral and economic sciences have played in 
the making of marketing’s paradigms and heritages. There is very little to be achieved 
with this, except for: 
 
1.  Pushing  a  perceived  strictly  managerial  agenda  of  marketing  forward,  thereby 
giving behavioral scientists yet another reason to go further astray from its thought 
and practice, and economics researchers another motive to resent and undervalue 
marketing  as  a  science  (Bolton,  2005;  Wilkie  and  Moore,  2003;  Wilkie  and 
Moore, 2005); 
2.  Feeding  a  fruitless  maniqueísm  between  tangible  and  intangible,  statics  and 
dynamics,  “economic”  behavior  and  “relationship”  behavior,  actions  and 
interactions, the homo economicus versus “normal people”, the self-interest of few 
against the altruistic good of many, etc.,  a paradigm which both contemporary 
economics  researchers  and  behavioral  scientists  have  already  themselves 
abandoned, since it simply does not reflect well the phenomena under study, nor 
does  it  help  in  advancing  their  comprehension  (Camerer,  2003;  Friedman  and 
Cassar, 2004; Handgraaf and van Raaij, 2005; MacFadden, 1999). 
 
Secondly,  restricting  oneself  to  the  creation  of  a  new  dominant  logic  for 
marketing  inherently  falls  short  of  providing  concrete  guidance  to  scholars  and   4 
practitioners as to what paradigms and activities must be envisaged, in order to address 
effectively the fundamental disciplinary issues involved. These are (Lusch, 1999): 
 
- How do agents (consumers, customers, governments and firms) really behave, and 
why? 
- How do markets really function and evolve, and why? 
- How do agents and markets really interact, and why? 
- How agents, markets and societies should interact in the real world, and why? 
 
Finally,  to  develop  a  new  disciplinary  logic  for  marketing  without 
simultaneously providing the necessary guidance as to which scientific paradigm should 
be envisaged in the pursuit of more and better knowledge - or, at least, prompt the 
debate  around  the  merits  of  alternative  or  complementing  marketing  research 
methodologies (Hunt, 1991) -, will probably prove itself insufficient in the long-run to 
motivate a corresponding new praxis.  
 
2. AIM 
The aim of this paper is to provide evidence supporting the tenet that recent 
theoretical, empirical and methodological progress in micro-economics can and should 
play a decisive role in the future development of marketing science. That such a notion 
can  not  yet  be  put  forward  without  raising  considerable  controversy  derives,  in  our 
view, more from an insufficient dissemination of knowledge across sciences, plus an 
outdated perception of supposedly irreconcilable differences between economists and 
psychologists, than from its lack of intrinsic value or broad cognitive appeal. Evidence 
supporting our main tenet is put forward by: 
 
1.  Providing a concise but clear description of the above-mentioned progresses of 
economic sciences;   
2.  Showing how these progresses can contribute to tackle the complex marketing 
research issues of today;  
3.  Supplying  examples  of  published  research  which  has  already  incorporated 
theoretical, empirical and methodological knowledge deriving from studies in   5 
behavioral and experimental economics in the pursuit of effective answers to 
marketing research issues.  
 
3.  DEVELOPMENTS  IN  ECONOMICS  WITH  RELEVANCE  FOR 
MARKETING SCIENCE 
3.1 Game Theory 
The actions of individual or collective decision-makers, who are aware of the 
consequences of these actions upon each other, constitute the object of study of game 
theory. In this way, game theory differs from decision theory, given that it considers 
both the analysis of the (sequences of) decisions and strategies devised when facing 
uncertainty and the interactions of decision-makers when “playing out” their strategies 
(Rasmusen, 2001). During the end of the last century, game theory became mainstream 
economics, being currently used in a wide array of both social and natural sciences. 
Game theory can be used to analyze such diverse behaviors as those of firms competing 
among each other, workers reacting to monetary incentives, the dissemination of social 
norms or gene evolution (Camerer, 2003; Camerer and Fehr, 2003). 
 
3.2 Experimental Economics 
Experimental economics can be loosely described as the systematic evaluation of 
economic  theories  under  controlled  laboratory  or  field  conditions.  As  models  of 
economic behavior evolved to more intricate and precise forms, their predictive power 
began to lag behind their sophistication, while theory testing through the econometric 
treatment of statistical data from existing “natural markets” became more difficult and 
costly. The use of experimentation in microeconomics has spread widely for the last 20 
years, providing an important means of bridging the gap between theoretical tenets and 
observed economic behavior and complementing empirical analysis (Davis and Holt, 
1993;  Kagel  and  Roth,  1995).  It  is  increasingly  used  to  test  behavioral  hypotheses, 
stress-test theory tenets, uncover empirical regularities in relations between economic 
variables, test-bed institutional policy choices, design or improve market institutions, 
study consumers preferences for and valuations of intangible goods, and teach micro-
economics (Bateman and Willis, 2001; Friedman and Cassar, 2004; Harrison, Harstad 
and Rutström, 2004). 
   6 
3.3 Behavioral Economics and Economic Psychology 
Standard, neoclassical economic behavior models are funded on the assumption 
that individuals are basically rational and self-interested, i.e., that their decisions and 
actions are guided solely by the maximization of the expected utility they predict will 
arise  from  own  material  payoff.  Though  longstanding,  convenient  and  useful,  this 
assumption has suffered many severe blows since the very onset of experimentation in 
both psychology and economics, as these activities painstakingly went on gathering a 
mounting  amount  of  evidence  against  it  (Kagel  and  Roth,  1995;  MacFadden,  1999; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). In the last 10 years, economists have finally began to 
come to terms with the idea that, at the very least, neoclassical economic theory will 
have to be seriously revised in the short-term, and that such a revision will necessarily 
start by looking beyond optimization and deduction to the study of how people actually 
behave, how decisions are made, implemented and monitored in organizations and how 
different markets function and evolve. (Camerer, 2003; Friedman and Cassar, 2004; 
Handgraaf and van Raaij, 2005).  
This evolutionary movement from within economic theory had led in the US to 
the foundation of behavioral economics (Camerer, 2003), a discipline that intentionally 
makes use of facts, models and methods from other social sciences with the purpose of 
providing a more accurate description of findings regarding human cognitive ability and 
social interaction. In this way, economists aspire at expanding their theoretical insights 
on economic behavior, making more accurate predictions of “natural” phenomena and 
being  able  to  provide  better  guidance  for  policy-making.  Conversely,  cognitive  and 
social  psychologists  are  warming  up  to  the  notions  that  (1)  robust  theory  improves 
dissemination, acceptance and implementation of the knowledge they develop; (2) self-
interest and rationality can perhaps explain a great more deal of human behavior than 
initially thought, and (3) that, even when they don’t, they still make useful benchmarks 
with which to compare actual behavior. This complementary evolution has culminated 
in the establishment in Europe of Economic Psychology, a discipline that focuses on the 
psychological foundations of economic decision-making behavior (Handgraaf and van 
Raaij, 2005; Ding, 2007a). 
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4.  WHY  SHOULD  DEVELOPMENTS  IN  ECONOMICS  BE  TAKEN  INTO 
ACCOUNT WHEN ADDRESSING FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF MARKETING 
SCIENCE? 
4.1 Conceptual arguments 
Economic  theory  has  served  marketing  science  long  and  well  (Wilkie  and 
Moore, 2003). Moreover, as described throughout section 3 of this paper, its on-going 
scientific growth, in an ever-increasing cooperation and convergence with other social 
sciences, illustrates not only its vitality but also its intent in continuing to pursue issues 
that  lay  at  the  very  heart  of  progress  for  marketing  science  (Lusch,  1999).  By 
recognizing  its  own  limitations,  and  being  willing  to  expand  beyond  its  conceptual 
borders to provide us with a better understanding of how individuals, organizations and 
markets  interact,  make  decisions  and  ultimately  evolve  the  way  they  do,  economic 
science  remains  instrumental  for  the  achievement  of  marketing’s  own  descriptive, 
predictive and normative ambitions. 
 
4.2 Methodological arguments 
Experimental  economic  frameworks  are,  of  course,  not  entirely  new  to 
marketing research (Beil, 1996; Lusk, 2003). For instance, the combined application of 
the  theory  of  value  (Lancaster,  1966)  and  random  utility  theory  (Thurstone,  1927; 
Manski, 1977) in the design of choice-based, conjoint analysis studies has been steadily 
diffusing since the early 1980’s (Louviere and Woodward, 1983; Carrol and Green, 
1995;  Ding,  Greewal  and  Lietchy,  2005;  Ding,  2007b).  But  laboratory  economic 
experiments have still more to offer, like a much in the demand capacity to: 
 
1.  Reproduce and expand upon each other’s studies independently in a controlled 
environment; 
2.  Strengthen the robustness of marketing science’s findings by  generating new 
observations in a less money- and labor intensive way; 
3.  Manipulate  variables  so  that  observed  behavior  can  be  used  to  evaluate 
alternative theories and policies (Davis and Holt, 1993; Kagel and Roth, 1995; 
Friedman and Cassar, 2004). 
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Moreover,  psychologists  and  economists  are  increasingly  converging  to 
common  ground  in  such  crucial  design  issues  as  the  monotonicity,  salience  and 
dominance  of  rewards  and  subjects’  privacy  and  absence  of  deceit  (Camerer,  2003; 
Hertwig  and  Orthman,  2001:  Handgraaf  and  van  Raaij,  2005).  Therefore,  all  the 
necessary  conditions  are  in  place  for  marketing  researchers  to  be  able  to  collect, 
analyze, combine and interpret as many types and as much behavioral data as they see 
fit to their purposes. 
 
5.  MARKETING  STUDIES  WITH  A  CONTEMPORARY  ECONOMIC 
FOUNDATION 
5.1 Valuing intangibles  
Perhaps  the  most  disseminated  application  of  experimental  economics  in 
marketing research so far is the use of experimental auctions to price and test market 
new  food  products  and  production  technologies  (Hayes,  Shogren  and  Kliebenstein, 
1996; Hoffman, Menkhaus, Charkrarvarti, Field and Whipple, 1993; Lusk, 2003).  Less 
known, but equally relevant for marketing science is the design of experiments that 
enable a deeper understanding of how individuals value environmental goods (Bateman 
and Willis, 2001; Hanley, Wright and Adamowicz (1998) and consumer information 
(Lee and Hatcher, 2001; Shogren, Fox, Hayes and Roosen, 1999). 
 
5.2 Understanding transactional/social relationships and designing new markets 
One of today’s most popular fields of research in economic behavior is on-line 
markets. For instance, Ariely and Simonson (2003) have recently conducted a series of 
laboratory  and  field  experiments  with  the  aim  of  analyzing  individual’s  bidding 
behavior in online auctions, while Spann, Skiera and Schäfers (2004) have looked into 
the question of how to collect on-line buyers’ willingness-to-pay information and use it 
in the design of on-line sellers’ pricing mechanisms. In an entirely distinct approach, 
Camerer and Fehr (2003) have devised a set of experimental games for measuring social 
norms and preferences with the aim of studying strategic interactions among people 
who are concerned with the pay-offs and economic outcomes of others than themselves. 
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5.3 Policy analysis and institutional engineering 
Apart  from  other  purposes,  experimental  and  behavioral  economics  can  help 
devise which policies are “right” and which institutional design is appropriate given 
specific set of temporal, financial and societal circumstances. For instance, experiments 
can  be  conducted  to  evaluate  existing  or  future  government  policies  regarding  the 
environment or market regulation, or help firms decide if, when and how they should 
enter new markets (Camerer, 2003; Rasmusen, 2001). On the other hand, institutional 
engineering, which hardly existed 20 years ago, nowadays dominates the landscape of 
several important private and public transactions, namely through the design of on-line 
and institutional auctions (Friedman and Cassar, 2004; McCabe, Rassenti and Smith, 
1991; Milgrom, 2000; Span, Skiera and Schäfers, 2004). 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although necessarily brief and concise, the evidence presented so far allows the 
maintenance  of  the  core  tenet  of  this  paper:  that  recent  theoretical,  empirical  and 
methodological progress in economics can and should play a decisive role in the future 
development  of  marketing  science.  It  is  our  hope  that  with  this  paper,  a  significant 
contribution has been given to an increased awareness amongst marketing scholars and 
practitioners  of  the  continued  existence,  validity  and  usefulness  of  scientific 
developments in economics. Additionally, we would like to believe that this paper sticks 
yet another nail to the coffin that will eventually helped bury that outdated myth about 
economists and psychologists not being able to work together. What can better disprove 
this  than  the  tradition  of  complex  challenges  and  common  grounds  that  marketing 
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